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Automatic Outbreak 
Detection Algorithm 
versus Electronic 
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Tim Eckmanns, and Gérard Krause
To determine efﬁ  cacy of automatic outbreak detection 
algorithms (AODAs), we analyzed 3,582 AODA signals and 
4,427 reports of outbreaks caused by Campylobacter spp. 
or norovirus during 2005–2006 in Germany. Local health 
departments reported local outbreaks with higher sensitivity 
and positive predictive value than did AODAs.
I
n 2001, the Robert Koch Institute, Germany’s federal 
institute for infectious disease control, implemented an 
electronic system (SurvNet) for notiﬁ  able infectious dis-
ease surveillance (1,2). Local health departments electroni-
cally sent reports of conﬁ  rmed cases to state health depart-
ments, which forwarded them to Robert Koch Institute. 
SurvNet can link single case reports to outbreak reports in 
which local health departments report descriptive outbreak 
information in a standardized manner (reported outbreaks). 
Additionally, the same software organizes the electronic 
transmission of single case reports from peripheral data-
bases from each local health department to databases of 
the respective state health department and ﬁ  nally to Robert 
Koch Institute. Automatic outbreak detection algorithms 
(AODAs), run weekly on this case-based data, generate 
signals when the observed number of cases per a speciﬁ  c 
week is higher than a deﬁ  ned threshold value (signal out-
breaks).
To identify the need to follow up generated signals, 
one must know the positive predictive value of AODA. 
This knowledge could avoid overwork in local health de-
partments because not every signal will require contacting 
the local ofﬁ  ce for investigation.
Our goal was to assess the probability that a signal gen-
erated by AODA reﬂ  ects a real outbreak (Campylobacter 
spp. or norovirus) being reported by local health depart-
ment. Previous studies have tested AODAs by comparing 
generated signals with simulated outbreaks superimposed 
on authentic syndromic surveillance data (3,4) or with a 
limited number of known natural outbreaks (5). In contrast 
to these approaches, we evaluated performance of AODA 
by comparing it with a large database of outbreaks elec-
tronically reported by local health departments, which we 
considered to be the reference standard (2).
The Study
We considered a signal outbreak to be identical to a 
reported outbreak when 1) >1 signal was triggered within 
the same period as the ﬁ  rst and last case belonging to the 
particular reported outbreak, 2) the signal outbreak was as-
sociated with the identical geographic location on the mu-
nicipal level (1 of the 430 municipalities) as the reported 
outbreak, and 3) the signal outbreak was associated with 
the identical pathogen (either Campylobacter spp. or noro-
virus). Using the data available as of June 1, 2007, we con-
sidered the number of reported outbreaks (a minimum of 4 
cases because the algorithm cannot detect outbreaks with 
<4 cases), from week 5 of 2005 through week 4 of 2007.
During the study period, 118 and 4,309 outbreaks with 
>4 cases, associated with the pathogens Campylobacter 
spp. and norovirus, respectively, had been reported. The 
AODA had signaled 52 (44.1%) of the 118 reported 
Campylobacter spp. outbreaks and 2,538 (58.9%) of the 
4,309 reported norovirus outbreaks (Table). The prob-
ability  that a signal outbreak reﬂ  ected a reported outbreak 
(positive predictive value of AODA) was lower for Campy-
lobacter spp. than for norovirus: 50 (6.4%) of 781 Campy-
lobacter spp. signal outbreaks and 2,115 (75.5%) of 2,801 
norovirus signal outbreaks were associated with reported 
outbreaks. The AODA may have triggered multiple signals 
during the outbreak if the threshold level was reached dur-
ing several consecutive weeks (Figure 1). Of the Campy-
lobacter spp. outbreaks, 3 (6.0%) were each identiﬁ  ed by 2 
different signals; of the norovirus outbreaks, 727 (28.6%) 
were identiﬁ  ed by multiple signals (2–20 signals per re-
ported outbreak) (Table). Furthermore, 1 signal outbreak 
could correspond with different reported outbreaks when 
these occurred in the same local area and during the same 
period (Figure 2). For Campylobacter spp., 4 (8.0%) of the 
outbreak signals could correspond to >1 reported outbreak; 
for norovirus, 760 (35.9%) of the signal outbreaks could 
correspond to 2–26 reported outbreaks (Table).
Conclusions
Germany´s electronic reporting system for infectious 
disease outbreaks provided a unique opportunity to com-
pare the triggering of signals through AODA with the re-
porting of outbreaks identiﬁ  ed by local health departments. 
The probability of an outbreak signal being associated with 
a reported outbreak was much lower for Campylobacter 
spp. (6.4%) than for norovirus (75.5%). Furthermore, the 
fraction of cases as part of a reported outbreak was much 
lower for Campylobacter spp. (3.3%) than for norovirus 
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(71.4%). Differences in route of transmission likely explain 
why Campylobacter spp. cases are generally more likely to 
occur sporadically and why norovirus cases are more likely 
to be part of an outbreak (6–9). These differences might re-
sult in a lower frequency of Campylobacter spp. outbreaks. 
The AODA might generate a signal when a higher than 
expected number of single cases is observed in a speciﬁ  c 
period and location, but this signal is likely to reﬂ  ect an in-
creased number of sporadic cases; an increased number of 
norovirus cases is more likely to reﬂ  ect an occurring noro-
virus outbreak. An alternative possibility is that local health 
departments are more inclined to identify, investigate, and 
report norovirus outbreaks than Campylobacter spp. out-
breaks (10). These differences demonstrate the importance 
of designing AODA speciﬁ  cally for the pathogens under 
surveillance.
For our analyses we used reported outbreaks as the ref-
erence standard by which to evaluate the AODA. Although 
this outbreak reporting is probably incomplete, we believe 
that it more closely identiﬁ  es the true number of outbreaks 
than does retrospectively identifying outbreaks (11) or sim-
ulating outbreaks (3,4). Thus, we believe it generates a bet-
ter reference standard than that used in previous studies.
Our  ﬁ  ndings question the usefulness of the AODA 
because a large number of generated signals were not 
conﬁ  rmed by the electronic outbreak reporting from local 
health departments. Our results suggest that AODAs are not 
useful for detecting outbreaks on a local level because the 
outbreaks are detected earlier and investigated by the local 
health department. AODAs might be more useful for de-
tecting multicounty or even multistate outbreaks, which are 
more difﬁ  cult to detect by a single local health department. 
The latter has been well demonstrated by AODA detection 
of various foodborne outbreaks in Germany (12,13). Na-
tional surveillance should focus on the follow-up of signals 
that indicate potential multicounty or multistate outbreaks. 
We used the county level for the algorithm because we ob-
tain the reported outbreaks on this level ﬁ  rst and we wanted 
to compare both systems. Our standard algorithms run also 
Table. Outbreaks January 31, 2005–January 28, 2007, reported and identified by detection algorithm* 
Outbreak characteristic  Campylobacter spp., no. (%)  Norovirus, no. (%) 
Total cases  114,176 144,568
Cases as part of a reported outbreak  3,767 (3.3)  103,177 (71.4) 
Reported outbreaks with <4 cases  1,453 5,074
Reported outbreaks with >4 cases  118 4,309†
Signal outbreaks generated by detection algorithm  781 2,801
Reported outbreaks with >4 cases identified by detection algorithm signals  52 (100)  2,538 (100) 
  Reported outbreaks identified by 1 signal  49 (94.0)  1,811 (71.4) 
  Reported outbreaks identified by >1 signal  3 (6.0)  727 (28.6) 
    Reported outbreaks identified by 2 signals‡  3 (6.0)  473 (18.6) 
    Reported outbreaks identified by >2 signals‡  0 254 (10.0) 
Signal outbreaks corresponding to reported outbreak with >4 cases  50 (100)  2,115 (100) 
  Signal outbreaks corresponding to 1 reported outbreak  46 (92.0)  1,355 (64.1) 
  Signal outbreaks corresponding to >1 reported outbreak  4 (8.0)  760 (35.9) 
    Signal outbreaks corresponding to 2 reported outbreaks§  3 (6.0)  408 (19.3) 
    Signal outbreaks corresponding to >2 reported outbreaks§  1 (2.0)  352 (16.7) 
*Data through June 1, 2007. Sensitivity detection algorithm 44.1% (52/118) for Campylobacter spp., 58.9% (2,538/4,309) for norovirus; no. reported 
outbreaks with >4 cases also identified by detection algorithm signal/total no. reported outbreaks with >4 cases. Positive predictive value of detection 
algorithm 6.4% (50/781) for Campylobacter spp., 75.5 (2,115/2,801) for norovirus. No. signal outbreaks identical to reported outbreak/total number of 
signal outbreaks.
†Excluded are 17 reported norovirus outbreaks of >25 wk and an average of <2 cases/wk because these are likely the result of data entry errors in 
SurvNet.  
‡During the duration of a reported outbreak, the detection algorithm may have triggered multiple signals during several consecutive weeks (Figure 1). 
§One signal outbreak may correspond to multiple reported outbreaks if different outbreaks occur in the same municipality during the same period  
(Figure 2).  
Figure 1. Example of 1 reported outbreak being detected by 3 
signals. In this example, 3 signal outbreaks (S1, S2, S3) can be 
associated with 1 reported outbreak in same municipality and 
during the same period.
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on federal and state levels, but that was not the subject of 
this investigation. To enable local health departments to 
earlier discover multicounty outbreaks, a new version of 
SurvNet is being developed. This version will give local 
health departments the opportunity to include more infor-
mation on the evidence and also the possibility of linking 
outbreaks from different counties (2). The Robert Koch In-
stitute, along with the state health departments, will devel-
op a standard operating procedure for how to communicate 
and follow up on signals generated by the AODA.
Our study suggests that the usefulness of AODA to de-
tect local outbreaks is limited because local health depart-
ments generally detect local outbreaks earlier and in more 
detail than these algorithms. Investment in the development 
of user-friendly outbreak reporting tools for local health 
departments might therefore provide better information on 
outbreaks than extensive reﬁ  nements of AODAs. 
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Figure 2. Example of 1 signal outbreak corresponding to multiple 
reported outbreaks. In this example, 1 signal outbreak (S1) can be 
associated with 3 reported outbreaks occuring in same municipality; 
threshold is reached in same week number.